The KGB ‘active measures’ campaigns of the Cold War employed essentially the same methods as those used in pro-Russian disinformation campaigns today. An analysis of the Cold War campaigns, in particular those that related to Afghanistan, enables us to identify their structure as well as the motives and ambitions that lay behind them. A comparison with what is known of modern-day disinformation campaigns shows that there are significant structural similarities between the active measures campaigns of the Cold War and disinformation campaigns employed today. Moreover, the analysis shows that many campaigns, then and now, involve three parties: those to be deceived, those cited or used in the disinformation, and those to be maligned – that is, cast as the main ‘villain’ – by the disinformation. Others have a bipartite structure, consisting of direct threats or criticisms towards the opponents, although still made via covert activity such as the secret planting of newspaper articles or via third parties. The analysis also shows that the disinformation activities of allies and ‘friendly’ organisations with their own agendas should not be overlooked or underestimated, and friendly nations are just as likely to be deceived as much as adversaries are. It is relatively rare for disinformation to be pure fabrication. Campaigns commonly involve exaggerated or adulterated versions of information that is true, or has some truth in it. Often, the exaggeration takes the form of alarmism; suggesting that a worst-case scenario is bound to arise from a situation that is known already to be problematic or threatening. Campaigns typically exploit the fear of traditional enemies, other ethnic groups, or the rise to power of a rival ideology or nation. Finally, the analysis shows that there is only a fine line between disinformation campaigns, news reporting, and diplomatic ‘influencing’. A dizzying array of actors and topics may be used in disinformation.
Publications of Michael Fredholm
